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Albert A. Foer and Robert H. Lande
The future of computers, software applications, and the Internet will in many ways determine the future of
the world's economy. This week’s Microsoft decision in Brussels reminds us that U.S. high tech companies
can do business in the rest of the world only if they abide by the same rules as other foreign companies. The
European competition authorities were rightly concerned that Microsoft might gain control over aspects of
the world's future technological progress and flow of information in ways never imagined by previous
generations. As a pundit remarked, “Microsoft is not your father’s Oldsmobile.”
The European Commission (“EC”) held that Microsoft violated European competition laws. As happened
during the Boeing and General Electric cases, we are already experiencing a gusher of government, editorial
and political outrage in the U.S. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration and some members of Congress
appear to be reacting with more emotion than diplomacy.
DOJ patronizingly lectured the EC, saying, “Sound antitrust policy must avoid chilling innovation and
competition even by 'dominant' companies.” Under the EC’s decree, however, Microsoft is free to innovate in
virtually every way. But Microsoft will have to fight the media player war through innovation, not by the
monopoly leveraging of a possibly inferior product onto reluctant consumers. The decree will give Microsoft
more, not less, incentive to innovate. And, of course, the main effect of the decree is intended to be that
other firms also will be able to innovate and bring their product to market. (Few rational investors would
invest in a company whose new products could be imitated by Microsoft, bundled into its monopoly
operating system, and then sold by Microsoft only as a package.)
DOJ also criticized the $613 million fine as excessive. Yet, it only amounts to roughly 1% of Microsoft’s
reported cash on hand, less than 2% of its worldwide annual sales, and was much less than Microsoft paid in
only one of the many private suits that it settled. The $613 million is only an indication that the European
trustbusters are serious. In fact, a much larger fine would be needed to affect Microsoft’s behavior.
Some members of Congress were even further off the mark. Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., called the decision
"intolerable," and Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., called the ruling "yet another example of Europe's consistent
harassment of American industry and policies that support our economic growth.”
Perhaps the administration is defensive because their own Microsoft settlement has been predictably
ineffectual. The June 2001 Microsoft appellate decision quoted the Supreme Court for the holding that the
purpose of the remedy was to “unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct,” to “terminate the illegal
monopoly, deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no
practices likely to result in monopolization in the future...” Today Microsoft still has the same 95% of the OS
market, the monopoly it was held to have illegally maintained using a dozen different types of predatory
tactics. Moreover, Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct mostly involved the browser market, of which
Microsoft had less than 60% at the time the record closed in the U.S. case. Now Microsoft’s share of this
market has reached monopoly proportions - it easily exceeds 90%.
Are the negative complaints justified?

The EC's antitrust case against Microsoft resulted from legitimate concerns over a wide array of
anticompetitive conduct that directly and substantially affects the European market. The EC engaged in five
years of careful and meticulous investigation before reaching its decision. The remedies that the EC ordered
are necessary, modest, and fair.
It should be stressed that the EC antitrust case against Microsoft involves different conduct and different
markets from the antitrust case filed by the U.S. Department of Justice and a group of States. In the US
case, the Court found that Microsoft illegally maintained its monopoly in the PC operating systems market by
engaging in a dozen different types of illegal acts, most of which involved Internet browsers and java
technology.
By contrast, the EC case involved an attempt by Microsoft to take over the market for workgroup server
operating systems (the software that makes computer networks operate) by deliberately restricting servers
made by other companies from working well with the 95% of PCs that use a Microsoft operating system. The
EU case also involved an attempt by Microsoft to take over the market for media players by tying the
Windows media player to the Windows operating system. (The U.S. Court of Appeals had remanded the U.S.
tying claim, which was not further pursued, but expressly held that similar “commingling” of software by
Microsoft violated U.S. antitrust law.)
Moreover, the remedy imposed in the U.S. case has done little or nothing to loosen Microsoft’s monopolistic
hold over the PC operating system market, or to prevent it from taking over the browser market. By
contrast, the EC decided that Microsoft must offer a PC operating system without Windows media player and
must reveal, for “reasonable remuneration,” enough information so that non-Microsoft servers can
interoperate with PCs on an “equal footing” with Microsoft’s own servers. If this remedy is not put on hold
pending the forthcoming appeal, there is no guarantee that it will succeed, but at least it stands an excellent
chance of opening up the media player and server markets to true competition. The Europeans have no
favored child in this fight - their interest is in opening up the affected markets to competition so that the
resulting increased innovation will benefit all consumers in the form of better choices and lower prices. It is
ironic that the firms whose innovative efforts Microsoft anticompetitively suppressed were mostly American.
The main purpose of the EC’s remedy is to enhance their ability to innovate, which will benefit both
European and American consumers.
Ignore the jingoism and the claims that European antitrusters don’t understanding modern economics. Be
skeptical of declarations that their competition policy regime favors European companies or picks on
American companies. Focus instead on Microsoft’s conduct that these respected, experienced professionals
found after five years of study to be anticompetitive and what, in that light, it will take to restore and
protect competition in the future. It is time to give the Europeans their due as professional protectors of
competition.
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